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บทคัดยอ 
การพัฒนาและความกาวหนาทางเศรษฐกจิในโลกยุคปจจบุันมุงเนนไปยังดานเทคโนโลยีขอมูลขาวสาร
เปนหลัก ดังนัน้สิทธิในทรัพยสินทางปญญาจึงมีบทบาทสําคัญในการคุมครองผลประโยชนของชาตทิี่
พัฒนาแลวทั้งหลาย  โดยผลของการริเร่ิมองคกรการคาโลกและกระบวนการในการทําความตกลง
เกี่ยวกับมาตรฐานของสิทธิในทรัพยสินทางปญญาที่เกี่ยวของกับการคา ซ่ึงไดรับการหนุนหลังจาก
มาตรการที่เขมงวดจากสหรฐัอเมริกา  ทําใหระบบของการคุมครองทรัพยสินทางปญญาทั่วโลกไดรับ
การอภิวัฒนไปพรอมกัน อยางไรก็ตามประเทศกําลังพฒันาก็จําตองเผชิญกับปญหาบางประการที่
เกี่ยวของกับการบังคับใชกฎหมายทรัพยสินทางปญญาที่ไดอิทธิพลจากประเทศตะวนัตก 
 
Abstract 
 The development and advancement of economy in today’s world focuses on information-based 
technology. Therefore, an intellectual property right has played a major role as a protection of 
considerable interest of developed nations. As a result of initiation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the progression of an agreement for standards of trade-related intellectual property rights, 
backed up by tough measures from United States, system of intellectual property rights protection has 
been globalized. Nevertheless, developing countries have to encounter some problems with regard to 
enforcing and implementing westernized intellectual property rights law. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 Since economy in this modern world has increasingly developed and is 
forwarding themselves further into information-based community, intellectual property 
rights protection has become a considerable interest for developed nations. According to 
the initiation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the progression of an agreement 
for standards of trade-related intellectual property rights along with tough measures from 
United States, world society is moving to a global system of intellectual property rights 
protection. However, there are some problems with regard to enforcing and implementing 
intellectual property rights protection especially in developing countries. By analyzing 
the implementation of TRIPS agreement and the tools which it is enforced, this paper 
illustrates the consequences of progressive system of intellectual property rights 
protection for developing countries and the problem of implementation and enforcement 
of intellectual property law in developing countries. Part II will provide a broad 
background of intellectual property. Part III will state the principles of TRIPS agreement. 
Part IV illustrates the unilateral pressures from United States to developing countries. 
                                                 
∗ Lecturer of Graduate School of Law, Assumption University. LL.B. 
(Thammasat), B.A. in Political Science, M.L.I. (University of  Wisconsin-Madison), 
LL.M. (Cornell University), Thai Barrister at Law, Research Fellowship under Patronage 
of Government of Japan (Monbukagakusho) at Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan 
 
  
Praphrut Chatprapachai                                                                               AULJ  Vol. II : No. I - 43 - 
Part V will discuss the problems of IPRs enforcement in developing countries. Finally, 
Part VI reaches the conclusion by providing some recommendations to deal with IPRs 
problems in developing countries.     
 
II. Background Information of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
An intellectual property, mostly known as IP, allows people to own their 
creativity and innovation in the same manner as they can own physical property. The 
owner of IP can control and be rewarded for its use.1 In some cases, IP gives rise to 
protection for ideas but in other areas more elaboration of an idea shall be proven before 
protection can arise. It will often not be possible to protect IP rights (or IPRs) unless 
applications for registration have been submitted to and be approved by the IP authorities, 
but some IP protection such as copyright arises automatically, without any registration, as 
soon as there is a record in some form of what has been created.2  
 Common description of intellectual property law often divides the IP to include 
patent, copyright, trademark and trade dress and trade secret law. These descriptions can 
be indistinctive sometimes. However, these categories provide general information of 
these subjects. 
 1. Patent: Patent specifies “inventions” and offers the inventor the right for a 
limited period of time to prohibit others from copying, using, selling or even developing 
products that incorporate the invention without the permission of the inventor.3 It is an 
agreement between an inventor and the state in which the inventor is allowed a short term 
monopoly in return for allowing the invention to be publicized. Patents include practical 
and technical expressions of products and processes. Most patents are for expansionary 
developments in known technology - evolution rather than revolution. However, the 
technology does not have to be complex, in order to get a patent. 
                                                 
1 World Trade Organization, What are intellectual property Rights?, available at       
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm.   
2 The IP Portal Team at the UK Patent Office, What is intellectual property or IP? 
available at  http://www.intellectual-property.gov.uk/std/faq/question1.htm. 
3 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations  Cases, Materials and Text 921 (West Group 4th ed. 
2002).  
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 Some conditions are also required to obtain a patent. Firstly, the invention must 
be new which means it must not comes from parts of the "state of the art." The state of 
the art is everything that has been made available to the public before the date of applying 
for the patent. This includes published documents and articles, but can also include use, 
display, spoken description, or any other way in which information is made available to 
the public before the applying date of such patent.4  
 Secondly, obviousness is another requirement. The patentable invention patent 
must involve an inventive method. As well as being new, the patentable invention must 
not be obvious to someone with knowledge and experience in the subject.  The final 
conditions of obtaining a patent is that such invention must be industrially applicable. 
This condition requires that the invention can be made or used in any kind of industry.5 
 When all above conditions have been fulfilled, the patented invention will be 
recorded in a patent document. The patent document must have a description of the 
invention, possibly with drawings, with enough detail for a person skilled in the area of 
technology to perform the invention. It must also contain claims to define the scope of the 
protection. The description is taken into account when interpreting the claim.6  
A patent can be of value to an inventor. As well as protecting his business, patents 
can be bought, sold, mortgaged, or licensed to others. They also benefit society other than 
the inventor himself because large amount of information can be learnt from other 
people’s patents. Patents can also deter people from reinventing things. Patents also help 
many people develop an idea further, and once the term of the patent expires it can be 
freely used or dealt with by anyone in order to benefit the public and the economy.7 
   2. Copyright: Copyright may be created by the creators from a wide range of 
sources, such as literature, art, music, sound recordings, films; and broadcasts. These 
economic rights entitle creators to control the use of their materials. It also provides 
moral rights to be identified as the creator of certain kinds of material, and to object to 
any distortion or impairment of it. However, copyright does not protect ideas, or such 
                                                 
4 The IP Portal Team at the UK Patent Office, What is Patents?  available  at  
http://www.intellectual-   property.gov.uk/std/faq/patents/what.htm . 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
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things as names or titles.  The purpose of copyright is to allow creators to gain economic 
rewards for their efforts and to encourage progressive creativity and the development of 
new material which benefits whole society. Copyright materials are usually the result of 
creative skill and devoted labor. Without protection, it would be too easy for others to 
exploit materials without compensating the creator.8 
Therefore, most copyright material uses require permission from the copyright 
holder. However, certain uses may not infringe copyright such as for non-commercial or 
academic purposes “which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the right holder”9 . 
  Copyright protection is automatically applicable as soon as there is a record in 
any form of the material that has been created, and there is no official registration form or 
fee. Creators, nevertheless, can take certain steps to help prove that they are the true 
creators, such as depositing a copy with a bank or solicitor.10  
 3. Trademark and trade dress law involve the rights of a seller to market a 
product or service in a particular manner and to prohibit others from transferring their 
goods and services in misleading fashion.  
 Trademarks are beneficial for a seller when they come to symbolize a level of 
quality or value of existing goods or services. Moreover, trademarks enable sellers to use 
a symbol or brand to identify their goods and increase uniqueness of their products. 
Concurrently, trademarks enable consumers to instantly identify the goods of a 
manufacturer or services of the service providers.11 
 If there is no trademark protection, other sellers might then be tempted to deceive 
consumers by using the trademark belonged to another entrepreneur which owns more 
popular products. Additionally, even when the trademark itself is not used by another, 
similar packaging or other manner of presentation (trade dress) can lure consumers into 
making mistaken purchases. Falsifications or misguiding manifestation of geographic 
                                                 
8 The IP Portal Team at the UK Patent Office, What is Patents?  available  at 
http://www.intellectual-   property.gov.uk/std/faq/patents/what.htm . 
9 TRIPS agreement Art.13. 
10 The IP Portal Team at the UK Patent Office, What is Copyrights? available at 
http://www.intellectual-   property.gov.uk/std/faq/copyrights/what.htm . 
11 See above n 3 at 924-925. 
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origin is another source of concern. Moreover, misguiding statements can cause people to 
engage in fraudulent transactions. 
 In addition, if sellers can misguide purchasers with impunity, purchasers will no 
longer trust trademarks or trade dress as symbols of quality. It will later become more 
difficult for sellers to obtain the rewards from efforts to produce high quality goods and 
services, and the ambition to provide quality in the marketplace will deteriorate.12  
 4. Trade secret law is closely related to patent law. Generally speaking, a trade 
secret is information that has value to the holder, which will be impaired if it is broadly 
known. Some trade secrets are the appropriate matter of patents, but their holder may 
choose not to follow a patent for some reasons, such as the fact that many significant 
information must be disclosed in the patent application procedure or that the application 
procedure and subsequent litigation may be costly. 
 Other trade secrets are simply unpatentable (such as customer list). Protection for 
trade secrets is usually limited to a prohibition on the use of “improper means” to secure 
them. Corporate espionage is actionable, such as the reveal of trade secret by a former 
employee. However, there is usually no protection if a trade secret is discovered through 
proper means, for example, reverse engineering or independent innovation, which is 
opposite to patent rights. These differences increase a number of questions that are not 
fully understood. One might wonder why protection for trade secrets is not broader or, 
why it exists at all if the secret is not patentable. We shall not try to solve these questions 
here, but simply note that some form of trade secret law seems to have evolved in most 
developed nations, although the details of that evolution and the extent of protection 
under the law has considerably varied.13 
  
Worldwide Unity of Intellectual Property Rights 
 Intellectual property may probably be the most global nature commodity in 
history  in today’s world, where another side of the world can be reached within less than 
one second. Intellectual property rights (IPRs), at the international level, have been 
subjected to many series of international conventions and treaties. One of the most 
                                                 
12 Id.   
13 Id.  
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prominent is Paris Convention for the protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the 
Berne Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 which are 
under the supervision of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).14 
 The protection under Paris and Berne Conventions is conceptualized on the 
doctrine of “national treatment”, which confirms that each sovereign state shall grant 
foreign nationals the same protection as they do for their own citizens. Another concept 
also standardize the minimum requirement that the laws of any member state shall be “no 
less favorable” with respect to foreigners than with respect to nationals.15 
 In the meantime, the trend toward global markets and the considerably increasing 
number of multinational enterprises has pressured many countries to liberalize their 
trading laws by treating domestic and foreign producers equally, and by giving the same 
standards of intellectual property protection as their trading partners. Therefore, there was 
an increasing motivation to promote wider uniformity in the content of domestic IP law.16    
 As a result, at the end of 1980s, developed countries, especially the United States 
which its economy was definitely affected from IPRs infringement, began to take out the 
IP infringement debate from WIPO, attempting to combine the intellectual property rights 
issue with the issue of free trade. This was the reason why the Uruguay Round trade 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included 
negotiations about intellectual property. This told us that free trade negotiation was 
attached with negotiation on IPRs, which became the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). TRIPS now prescribes the minimum standard 
for national and regional IPRs systems in the world.17  
 Accordingly, in Marrakesh on April 15 1994, 111 countries signed the GATT 
agreement which contains the outcome from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiation. TRIPS is attached in Annex 1C of the GATT Agreement, which enforce the 
                                                 
14 See Mark Wu, Intellectual Property Rights in Global Trade Framework: IP 
Trends in Developing Countries, 98   Am. Soc’y Int’l. L. Proc. 104 (2004). 
15 Art. 3 , Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 
1883. 
16 Joshua J. Simons, Cooperation and Coercion: The Protection of Intellectual 
Property in Developing Countries,  11 Bond L. Rev. 60 (1999).  
17 Id.  
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protection of intellectual property by signatories. 18  The TRIPS Agreement created 
common minimum baseline standards in significant scope of intellectual property, higher 
than the Paris and Berne Convention. This emphasizes the prominence of shifting IPRs 
protection to a universal level of protection.19 However, in the mean time, this is also a 
challenging problem for many developing countries to enforce their IP law to meet such 
international standards and to further their own priorities in terms of economic and social 
development.  
 
 Different Legal Tradition of IPRs: Difficulty for Developing Countries  
 Before the signing of TRIPS Agreement, member nations were not bound to 
develop intellectual property protection systems. The Paris and Berne conventions only 
require a member nation to grant the same rights and obligations of intellectual property 
to non-nationals as it does to its own citizens. However, under TRIPS, states can be 
obliged through WTO enforcement mechanisms to adopt certain standards that are 
unfamiliar with their legal tradition.20 
 Each nation has different cultures, traditions and histories which result in 
differences of each unique domestic legal system. There are various attitudes in 
intellectual property between developed and developing countries especially in the east. 
 In Westerners’ attitudes, copyright is a social incentive and a reward to encourage 
individual creators to create. On the contrary, Eastern artists gain validity from 
mimicking previous works instead of from creating. Since, in eastern cultural view, 
comprehension of the concept of the civilization is proven by mimicking, therefore, 
South Korea used this as an argument in the delegation at the Uruguay Round, reasoning 
that copying the work from other creators was a form of flattery; hence they were not 
culturally suitable for certain copyright protection.21 Additionally, in Japan, a katana 
(Japanese sword) is not only a lifeless metal object, but also the residue of creator’s living 
                                                 
18 Id. at 61   
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
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spirit. This cultural perception still exists in the craftsmanship of Japan industrial 
products.22 
 Lack of individualism is another source that differentiate attitude concerning IPRs 
between Western developed and developing countries. In Western countries, only the 
individual (or corporate juristic person) is considered a “creator.” Conversely, in many 
developing countries, for example, to the Balinese, artistic knowledge is not restricted to 
a special intellectual class. The words of art or artist do not exist in Balinese. If someone 
have made a beautiful contribution such as carving a temple gate, or playing a musical 
instrument and doing any works of esthetic importance that are produced incognito. They 
are deemed to be done entirely as a service to society and religion with no thought of 
personal gain.23  
 This kind of cultural attitude also exist among Koreans who pursues a similar 
historical viewpoint on scientific inventions. They consider intellectual property as 
“public goods” for everyone to share freely instead of treating it as a private property. By 
this traditional way of thought, creativity is encouraged by cultural esteem rather than 
material gain.24  
 Nevertheless, concepts of “private rights” and “trade-related” rights of intellectual 
property are clearly defined in the preamble of TRIPS Agreement but exclude community 
intellectual property rights. This exclusion nullifies all kinds of knowledge, ideas and 
innovations produced by the intellectual community.25 
 In developing countries, intellectual property is seen as the product of intelligence 
or cultural heritage, embodying the soul and spirit of the people. Such concept is 
unfamiliar in the Western legal system. However, since TRIPS is a prerequisite to 
accession of WTO, developing nations had to inevitably accept the intellectual property 
laws of the West.  This causes an everlasting dispute between developed and developing 
countries until now.26  
 
                                                 
22 Id. at 62  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 63. 
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III. The Principles of TRIPS Agreement 
 The TRIPS came into effect on January 1, 1995. Member countries are bound to 
strengthen their IPR laws by providing the minimum degree of IPR protections. 
Countries are mandated to accept the provisions of the four previous IPR agreements27 
and are bound to give the same treatment accorded to their own foreign intellectual 
property. 28  The TRIPS emphasizes significance of patentability 29  ; and imposes 
protection for plant varieties30, computer programs31 and databases.32  
 The minimum standards of IPRs protection which each state is mandated to 
implement are illustrated in Part II of the Agreement. It stipulates, defines and names 
fundamentals of IPRs protection and the subject-matter to be protected; the rights to be 
conferred and permissible exceptions to those rights, and the minimum duration of 
protection. Under this TRIPS, member states shall standardize their IPRs laws to comply 
with the substantive obligations of the main convention to the WIPO, and the Paris and 
Berne Conventions in their most recent versions. Moreover, TRIPS Agreement fulfills 
numbers of obligations on the issues which are ignored by the pre-existing conventions or 
were seen as inadequate.33  
 Although it is quite common knowledge that TRIPS standard is more difficult for 
developing countries to enforce than for developed countries which already have 
previous similar standard, since TRIPS standard is the obligation which must be 
primarily met by member countries before entering WTO protection, developing nations 
must inevitably accept such commitments despite they are excessive for the actual level 
in any developing country.34  
                                                 
27 Those four agreements are Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention 
(1971), the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits. See Art. 1, TRIPS Agreement. 
28 Art. 3, TRIPS Agreement. 
29 Art 7, TRIPS Agreement. 
30 Art 27.3(b), TRIPS Agreement. 
31 Art 10.1, TRIPS Agreement. 
32 Art 10.2, TRIPS Agreement. 
33 World Trade Organization, A Summary of  the Final Act of the Uruguay Round: 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at   
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement.     
34 See above n. 16 at 64. 
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 The regulations about enforcement of intellectual property rights that the states 
must follow are illustratively structured in Part III of TRIPS. Effective enforcement, fair 
and equitable procedures are indentified as general commitments which states must 
respect. 35  The Agreement also delineates remedies in both civil and administrative 
aspects that Members must preserve, including injunctions, damages, and –under certain 
circumstances- the removal from commerce or destruction of infringing goods. 36 
Furthermore, Part III contains provisions relating to provisional enforcement measures, 
special requirements related to broader measures, and criminal sanction procedures on 
“willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on commercial scale”. 
  In addition, with intention to strengthen IPRs protection, TRIPS agreement 
requires that member nations must enforce sufficient measures to “provide a deterrent 
consistent with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity”.37 
 Article 41.5 of TRIPS may seem to limit the comprehensive outline of civil, 
administrative, and criminal remedies. In brief, the provision merely states that states do 
not have to put in place a specific judicial system for enforcement of IPRs (such as a 
court of specialty) distinct from court system that already exist in member states.38 
Nevertheless, the language that urges a member state to equally distribute resources 
between intellectual property enforcement and general law enforcement may impact the 
developing countries where the governments have limited resources to devote even for 
general laws enforcement.39  
 
 Handicap for Developing Countries.  
 Because the TRIPS Agreement is a prerequisite to accession of WTO 40 , 
developing nations, in order to enjoy the benefits of membership of the WTO, have to 
fully implement it while encountering large amounts of difficulties. Fortunately, Part VI 
                                                 
35 See above n. 32 
36 Part3;Section 2, TRIPS Agreement. 
37 Art. 61, TRIPS Agreement. 
38 See above n. 16 at 65 
39 See above n. 14 at 105. 
40 Art 4, WTO agreement. 
  
Praphrut Chatprapachai                                                                               AULJ  Vol. II : No. I - 52 - 
of TRIPS describes transitional arrangements that developing member states can enjoy.41 
The TRIPS transitional arrangements provide a special extension period and give some 
exceptions to the implementation of TRIPS to certain members. For instance, under 
special situations, TRIPS allows developing countries and members which are 
transforming their economies from centrally-planned to market, free-enterprise 
economies to benefit from a period of delay for following up TRIPS provisions42.  
 The obligations under the TRIPS Agreement apply the same to all Members, but 
least developed countries are granted a longer period to phase them in43. However, the 
transitional period granted for developing countries to enjoy the delay of implementing 
intellectual property protection seems to confront with obstacles due to the use of 
unilateral pressure from United States to tackle its IPR disputes44.  
 
IV. Tension from United States 
 In the past 20 years, compared to other countries, United States has been more 
devoted to the innovation of establishment of uniform intellectual property rights.45 In 
addition, the prospect of United States’ economy significantly depends on the export of 
intellectual property.46  
 Therefore, United States has tried to build up a harmonious connection between 
requirement of enforcement of universal intellectual property standards and the 
international trade regime and the development. Then, finally, countries which desire to 
enjoy free trade had to agree on TRIPS.  
 Most member nations, especially developing countries normally import 
intellectual property rather than export. Therefore, they have less concentration than the 
United States to firstly prioritize IPRs legal protection because it did not worth enough 
for their budget to devote resources to serve the benefits of foreign IPRs holders, or to 
                                                 
41 Art 65,66, TRIPS Agreement. 
42 Art 65.3, TRIPS Agreement. 
43 Art 66, TRIPS Agreement. 
44 See above n. 16 at 67. 
45 Id. at 70.  
46 Id. at 67. 
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hinder local duplication industries from doing imitation business since such hindrance 
could negatively impact their national economies.47 
 United States enforced section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended) to 
pressure developing countries. By virtue of this provision, U.S. companies can protect 
themselves from imports into the United States of goods made by foreign companies that 
infringe U.S. intellectual property rights. It legalizes complete exclusion of imports which 
has been produced in such a way as to violate the intellectual property rights of American 
companies or individuals under domestic US law. However, only the products that are 
imported into United States are subjected to this provision.48  
 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is another tool enforced by United 
States to pressure developing countries which are under GSP agreement. If intellectual 
property protection, either de facto or de jure, of particular developing countries is 
decided to be vulnerable, any tariff preferences that previously granted to such nations 
under GSP can be withdrawn. In order to use this tool, a particular American industry is 
not required to show the injury nor something that shows the discriminatory practice or 
inferior-international-standard of   intellectual property laws of the country concerned.49  
 ‘Special 301’ is another well-known, multi-purpose and roomy provision which 
U.S. has relied on. It is a part of the of the Trade Act of 1974 since U.S. Trade Law was 
amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Acts of 1988. The so called section 
301 provision of the Trade Act of 1974 empower the U.S. government to penalize 
countries which apply inadequate or ineffective protection of intellectual property rights. 
Under Special 301, the U.S. Trade representative (USTR) is assigned to identify foreign 
countries that impair adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights or 
impair fair and equitable market access for US persons who rely on intellectual property 
                                                 
47 See above n. 44. 
48 United States Tariff Act of § 337, 19 U.S.C. 1337 (1930).  
49 See also Office of the United States Trade Representatives, USTR to Examine 
Operation of GSP Program, available at  http://www. ustr.gov/Document_ 
Library/Press_ Releases/2005/October/USTR_to_Examine_Operation_of_GSP_Program. 
html?ht=gsp%20gsp. 
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protection.50 Moreover, with the intention to optimize the effectiveness of Special 301, its 
amendment came out in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement Act clarifying that although 
a country is in compliance with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, it still can be 
determined to deny adequate and effective intellectual property protection. It was also 
amended to direct USTR to consider a previous status of a country under Special 301.51  
Once a country is identified because it does not follow up on its commitments for 
IPR protection and enforcement, the USTR is required to decide whether it should be 
designated in priority watch list as Priority Foreign Country. Such country is defined as 
the one that: 
(1) has the most onerous and egregious acts, policies, and practices which have 
the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products; and 
(2) is not engaged in good faith negotiations or making significant progress in 
negotiations to address these problems. 
  If a trading partner is identified as a Priority Foreign Country, USTR must decide 
within 30 days whether to start an investigation of those acts, policies, and practices that 
were the basis for identifying the country as a Priority Foreign Country.52 
 Such amendments of the Trade Act, furnish weapon for U.S. to be able to 
enforce trade sanctions upon a watched country if it fails to adequately protect its 
intellectual property. Section 301 authorizes the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) to compel special duties on imports, establish the charges by negotiating new 
bilateral agreements, suspend trade agreement preferences, accomplish any other 
‘appropriate and feasible’ functions to perpetuate U.S. rights under trade agreement or 
implement a responsive measure to a country which its own government practices are 
found to be unreasonable and afflict U.S. commerce53.  
                                                 
50 Office of United States Trade Representatives, Background on Special 301, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/ Reports_Publications/2005/ 
2005_ Special_ 301/asset_upload_file223_7646.pdf (accessed on Oct 2005). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Ronald  J. T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries, 35 Int’l L. 1092  (2001). 
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The U.S. executive branch uses the power granted by Section 301 to drive foreign 
countries to protect overseas U.S. intellectual property by genuinely enforcing intellectual 
property laws. Furthermore, although the infringing product or process has never been 
conveyed to the U.S., the President can strike back by enjoining restrictions or duties 
against the infringing country on other goods that such country produced and imported to 
U.S.  
Such threats of sanction under Section 301 had remarkably success in pressuring 
developing countries to provide effective legislative protection of intellectual property 
rights. For example, in 1987 and 1989, Mexico was indicated in the Section 301 watch 
list because its legislation failed to suffice patent protection. Nevertheless, promptly after 
the “Program of Modernization of Industry and Foreign Trade” was proclaimed in 1991 
by Mexican government, Mexico was withdrawn from the Section 301 watch list. This is 
because the Program clearly emphasized the implementation for strengthening 
intellectual property protection. As a result of legislation enacted, it influenced Mexican 
government to commonly advance the integrity of intellectual property, especially for 
more active patent legislation.54  
 Another accomplishment derived from U.S. pressure is the case of Brazil which 
started to amend its IP law in April 1996. The redesigned enactment included a launch of 
modern property law which implemented patent protection. In addition, the market 
accessibility of any products relying on such protection was increased. This was an 
attempt to resolve a section 301 investigation previously committed by Brazil in February 
1994.55   
 
Developing Countries under US Approaches  
The trade-dealing functions of the U.S. pertaining to developing countries are 
illustrated in the Trade Act. Because the United States realizes that arguments of 
countries that do not provide strong intellectual property protection are inconceivable, 
under the 1988 Trade Act, the U.S. aims to “ensure that developing countries promote 
economic development… by providing reciprocal benefits and assuming equivalent 
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obligations with regard to their import and export practices”. 56  Typically, the U.S. 
contends that both industrial and developing countries will be benefitted from such 
measure.57 
Obstruction of the transfer of technology is one of the strongest arguments raised 
by developing countries. They maintain that intellectual property protection restrains the 
transfer of technology to developing countries. The United States then counter that the 
transfer of technology into a country cannot be optimally encouraged without fair 
protection and effective enforcement of intellectual property rights as long as effective IP 
laws will increase the confident of a rights holder to market his invention outside his 
home country. Additionally, this can lead to the reduction of price of imported 
technology.58  
The U.S. also claims that it will be too risky for a country that state-of-the-art 
technology may never be promoted if effective intellectual property rights protection is 
not practically enforced. 
Some scholars consider this argument convincing. Suppose a creator had newly 
created an innovation, if an adequate and effective IP protection were provided, he might 
tend to reveal his creation to public rather than keeping it as trade secret. This is the 
reason why speedy approaches to the most recent innovations of technology are 
necessary for sciencetific researchers or technology developers who are responsible for 
setting up new industries or modifying old ones. It also prevents researchers from 
accidently devoting their experimental resources on work already done. Furthermore, 
since resources are not spent to imitate the outcome already known, it enhances the 
further advancement of innovation and increase the efficiency of research59      
Nevertheless, public disclosure of technology under IP protection seems not to 
advantage developing countries as previously expected. Because deficiency of adequate 
infrastructure to conduct innovative research still dominates many developing countries 
which always thirst for new technology and where the concept of commercial intellect 
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may be too distant to be aware of, thus, for them, the logic that they can gain profit from 
effective intellectual property protection is often considered unpersuasive.60 
In addition, governments of developing countries have affirmed that free sharing 
of the benefit of creativity and free transfer of technology are necessary.  Excessive 
protection may economically cause a monopoly on knowledge and exclude competitors 
who may be able to adapt or imitate the invention in a valuable way for the whole 
society. They allege that as a result, such strictness will stimulate the cost of products to 
become higher.61    
Despite of those arguments, unfortunately, since the economic growth and 
development of majority of developing countries mainly depend on their trading with the 
U.S., the pressure from United States for demanding developing nations to solidify their 
intellectual property protection has continuously proceeded. Therefore, the most powerful 
scheme for the U.S. to carry on such pressure is to commingle the affiliation between 
more cooperative trade relation and stronger protection of intellectual property rights.62 
 
V. Problems of Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
Although the TRIPS Agreement and US unilateral action may achieve results on 
paper, there still are several factors that impair the enforcement of IPRs in developing 
countries.  
The first factor that contributes to problem in IPRs enforcement in developing 
countries is technological change. The necessary technology and equipment for 
generating counterfeit or pirate goods have become cheaper and more sophisticated, for 
example, the rapid growth of cheaper CDs and DVDs burners, high-quality scanners and 
photocopiers. This has made things easier to make production more worldwide. It means 
that if infringing operations are freezed in one country, they easily shift to another.63  
Political will becomes the second influential factor. Strengthening IPRs is not 
politically attractive enough to be the best interests for every national government. Some 
are intimidated by the powerful organization involved in IPRs-infringing operations. 
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Others worry about the impact of unemployment, even though illegal, on a struggling 
local economy if the authorities clamp down too hard. Although stronger IPRs protection 
and enforcement may be able to advance new local industries and additional foreign 
investment and increase accessibility to the information and technology necessary for 
growth, economic growth also significantly depends on other factors, such as high levels 
of human capital attainment, efficient capital allocation, political stability, and strong 
physical infrastructure. Therefore, without many of these factors in place, the idea which 
asserts that increased IPRs protection and enforcement leads to increased economic 
growth will face difficulty in carrying weight with many governments. The lack of 
domestic ballotters who are actively supporting stronger IPRs in some countries further 
enlarge the suspicion of politicians about the political benefit they can gain after 
strengthening IPRs enforcement.64  
Weak politics lead to the third factor which is inadequate resources. Not so many 
developing countries have invested substantial funds in IPR training for customs official, 
judges, and prosecutor. Some, such as Thailand, have set up specialized IP courts. But 
most developing countries have not seriously armed their authorities to encounter IPRs 
crimes either because they do not have sufficient resources or because they are not 
willing to commit additional resources. Equipping specialized knowledge of IPRs among 
those prosecuting alleged infringers, deciding IP cases, and inspecting seizures of 
suspected goods should be included in the mission to be accomplished65  
Another significant factor is about the problems of TRIPS. It is not too difficult 
for developing countries to raise a reasonable argument on the issue why they will resist 
incorporating the TRIPS’ minimum standards into their domestic law. Most intellectual 
property belongs to foreigners; therefore, enforcing TRIPS provisions leads to a transfer 
of wealth from developing to developed countries. Moreover, enforcing TRIPS 
negatively impacts domestic business that developed in the past because they were able 
to steal intellectual property from others. TRIPS also affects the sovereign rights of 
countries to develop independently from foreign influence. Finally, although individual 
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ownership of intellectual property is considered as a basic right in western developed 
countries, this may not be the case in some developing countries.66 
The TRIPS also has enough ambiguities and exception to allow developing 
countries to interpret the agreement in a manner that is best suitable to their short-term 
needs. For example, the TRIPS allows nations to deny protection to intellectual property 
rights in the interest of protecting the health and safety of its citizen-thus presenting a 
large loophole through which developing countries can maintain trade barrier in the 
pharmaceutical industry. In addition, as a concession to developing countries, the TRIPS 
gives countries direction to grant licenses to remedy anti-competitive abuses of 
intellectual property rights.67  
The minimum standards for the domestic enforcement of the substantive rights 
mentioned in the TRIPS have also been criticized as weak because they merely provide 
wide legal standards and mandate respect for differences in national legal systems rather 
than present a set of narrow well define rules. For example, the TRIPS explicitly waives 
any requirement for WTO members to “put in place a judicial system for the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights distinct from that [used] for the enforcement of law in 
general.”68  
Although indicating to harmonize intellectual property rights by holding all WTO 
members to the same standards, the transitional arrangements built into the TRIPS 
contains the mean to perpetuate a double-standard system. The TRIPS expressly allows 
extensions of the eleven-year transition period for least developed countries if they have 
“special needs and requirement…and the need…to create a viable technological base.” 
The TRIPS may also provide a means by which developing countries may get an 
extension beyond the five-year transition, which ended on January 1, 2000.69  
However, some critics said that developed nations should not view these 
flexibilities as a weak point that may jeopardize their economic gain because significant 
evidence shows that a lenient policy on IPRs law enforcement advantages both 
developing countries and their industrial partners. They indicate that stricter intellectual 
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property rights detriment the developing nation, and if the infringement rate is fairly 
minimalized, it will benefit the developed country.70 
The critics also exemplifies that there are numbers of countries that their level of 
economic growth highly increases due to low level of IPRs protection. Japan, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong included weak patent laws as a part of economic plans. These 
countries succeeded in developing industrial infrastructures that based on high level of 
technology simply by neglecting the patent rights of semiconductor companies from the 
U.S. After developing countries have successfully shifted themselves to manufacturing 
new technologies and innovations, then, strengthening IPR laws and regulations will 
become their incentives.71  
  
VI. Recommendation and Conclusion 
Due to the globalization driven by information technology, it is almost impossible 
to deny the essential of implementing transnational intellectual property protection. 
TRIPS Agreement has been inevitably framed and internationally adopted, in spite of its 
cultural inappropriateness. Uniform system of global IPRs protection seems to be the last 
chapter of the epic.  
Do the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which urge developing countries to 
level up their IPRs protection systems really benefit them? The answer seems to be yes in 
the long run because these countries would be in a more advantageous position if they 
deliberately level up stronger intellectual property.72  
As previously analyzed, although the United States has succeeded in applying 
coercive measure to pressure developing countries to achieve legal compliance on black 
letter law, enabling them to develop the implement action of the basic systematic 
framework of intellectual property protection, consequent enforcement is still far from 
achievement. Once a new legislative foundation has been framed, more necessary 
measures are required to be fulfilled. Not only the difficulty and tardiness that they need 
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to face during the process of training officials, they also have to seriously revise national 
court system according to TRIPS.73 
Besides struggling at level of officials, many developing countries are trying to 
educate their citizens about importance of intellectual property rights, and the effect of 
IPRs which relates to development of their own countries. For example, Costa Riga has 
launched public campaigns to provide knowledge concerning IPRs to its citizens, 
together with implemented new intellectual property laws. This is a good model for 
perpetually strengthening IPRs regime in which “states need to concern themselves not 
just with signing international instruments or passing law but they also have to deal with 
educational programs that reach the public.”74  
Cooperative engagement between developed and developing nations is 
unavoidable to tackle problems concerning enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
developing countries. Moreover, instead of using trade barrier scheme to pressure 
developing countries to enhance their IP protection, developed nations should sincerely 
advocate them by supplying proficiency and fund to solve these problems. TRIPS may 
not be a healer-of –all and should not be deemed as a broad-spectrum drug. However, an 
equitable and universal system of IPRs protection cannot be achieved without TRIPS as 
an origin.  
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